In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the Supreme Court considered "whether an accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial is denied due process or equal protection of the laws." Id. at 502. On the morning of trial, the defendant had asked an officer at the jail to allow him to wear civilian clothes, but his request was denied. Subsequently, at trial, neither the defendant nor his counsel made any objection to the identifiable prison attire worn by the defendant. The Supreme Court recognized that, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, a state cannot "compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes." Id. at 512. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger explained: The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. ... To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the factfinding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. ... The potential effects of presenting an accused before the jury in prison attire need not, however, be measured in the abstract. Courts have, with few exceptions, determined that an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption [of innocence] so basic to the adversary system. . . . This is a recognition that the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment. The defendant's clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play. ... Unlike physical restraints . . . compelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no essential state policy. . . . Similarly troubling is the fact that compelling the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates usually against only those who cannot post bail prior to trial. Persons who can secure release are not subjected to this condition. To impose the condition on one category of defendants, over objection, would be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. (425 U.S. at 503-06.) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant's failure to timely object at trial to the prison garments constituted a waiver of his claim of compulsion. (425 U.S. at 509-10, 513.)