In Ex Parte Bollman (1807) 8 U.S. 75, the issue presented was whether the Supreme Court had the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the release of two prisoners held for trial under warrant of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. Counsel for the detainees asserted not only statutory authority for issuance of the writ, but inherent power. See id., at 77-93. The Court would have nothing to do with that, whether under Article III or any other provision. While acknowledging an inherent power of the courts "over their own officers, or to protect themselves, and their members, from being disturbed in the exercise of their functions," Marshall says that "the power of taking cognizance of any question between individuals, or between the government and individuals," Chief Justice John Marshall referred to the writ of habeas corpus as the "great writ must be given by written law." "The inquiry, therefore, on this motion will be, whether by any statute compatible with the constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a case as that of Erik Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court." Id., at 94. In the ensuing discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the opinion specifically addresses the Suspension Clause - not invoking it as a source of habeas jurisdiction, but to the contrary pointing out that without legislated habeas jurisdiction the Suspension Clause would have no effect. "It may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had declared `that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it.' "Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give to all the courts the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus." Id., at 95. Chief Justice Marshall held that the Supreme Court had the statutory power to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the release of two prisoners held for trial under warrant of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, but the Court rejected the argument that the Court had inherent power to issue the common law writs, other than habeas corpus ad prosequendum and habeas corpus ad testificundum. Chief Justice Marshall clarified the jurisdictional aspect as follows: Courts which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by their common law . . . ; but courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction . . . . For the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law; but the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law . . . . The inquiry therefore on this motion will be, whether by any statute, compatible with the constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court. The 14th section of the judicial act provides "that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment . . ." . . . The doubt which has been raised on this subject may be further explained by examining the character of the various writs of habeas corpus, and selecting those to which this general grant of power must be restricted, if taken in the limited sense of being merely used to enable the court to exercise its jurisdiction in causes which it is enabled to decide finally. The various writs of habeas corpus, as stated and accurately defined by judge Blackstone, (3 Bl. Com. 129.) are, 1st. The writ of habeas corpus ad respondendum, 'when a man hath a cause of action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior court; in order to remove the prisoner and charge him with this new action in the court above.' . . . 2d. The writ of habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum, 'when a prisoner hath had judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff is desirous to bring him up to some superior court to charge him with process of execution.'. . . 3d. Ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum, & c. 'which issue when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prosecute, or bear testimony, in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction wherein the fact was committed.' . . . 4th, and last. The common writ ad faciendum et recipiendum, 'which issues out of any of the courts of Westminster-hall, when a person is sued in some inferior jurisdiction, and is desirous to remove the action into the superior court, commanding the inferior judges to produce the body of the defendant, together with the day and cause of his caption and detainer, (whence the writ is frequently denominated an habeas corpus cum cause,) to do and receive whatever the king's court shall consider in that behalf. This writ is grantable of common right, without any motion in court, and it instantly supersedes all proceedings in the court below.' (Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75. at 93-98.)