In Ex Parte Vallandigham (1863) 68 U.S. 243, an Ohio resident had been tried and sentenced by a military commission, and its decision became final after being approved up the chain of command. Vallandigham sought relief directly from our Court, without first petitioning a lower federal court. The Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction. (Id., at 254.) The Supreme Court quoted an order prepared by Francis Leiber, LL.D., later approved by President Lincoln, which illustrated the Government's view in 1863 that the scope of military commission jurisdiction could be controlled by statute stating: It is affirmed in these instructions that military jurisdiction is of two kinds. First, that which is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the common law of war. Military offences, under the statute, must be tried in the manner therein directed; but military offences, which do not come within the statute, must be tried and punished under the common law of war. (Id. at 248-49) internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added. Historically, the jurisdiction for military commissions arose from two sources, the first is exercised by courts-martial, while cases which do not come within the rules and regulations of war, or the jurisdiction conferred by statute or court-martial, are tried by military commissions. These jurisdictions are applicable, not only to war with foreign nations, but to a rebellion .... (Id.)