Example of Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

In Davis v. United States (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2419, the United States Supreme Court evaluated the applicability of the good faith exception in a case involving a change in the law concerning the permissibility of automobile searches incident to arrest. Davis held that "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." (Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2423-2424, 2426-2429.) The Davis court explained that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right nor is it designed to redress the injury caused by an unconstitutional search; rather, its sole purpose is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations. (Id. at p. 2426.) "For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs." (Id. at p. 2427.) This cost-benefit analysis focuses on the "'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue. . . . When the police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. But when the police act with an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful . . . '"the deterrence rationale loses much of its force,"' and exclusion cannot 'pay its way.'" (Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2427-2428.) Davis elaborated that "police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 'meaningful' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.' . . . The police here acted in strict compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless the exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability regime, it can have no application to this case. . . . . . . When binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety responsibilities . . . ." (Id. at pp. 2428-2429.) In Davis v. United States (2011) the United States Supreme Court considered whether evidence obtained from a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate authority may be excluded pursuant to the exclusionary rule when that authority is overruled by a decision released after the search. The Davis court explained that the rule requiring exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is proper when the law enforcement action in question constitutes "'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent'" conduct. (Davis, supra, at p. 2427.) The Davis court explained that "the deterrent value of exclusion is strong" under these circumstances, and "tends to outweigh the resulting costs." (Ibid.) In contrast, when "the police act with an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful," the "'"deterrence rationale loses much of its force,"' and exclusion cannot 'pay its way."'" (Id. at p. 2428.) Permitting the exclusion of evidence obtained during a search conducted pursuant to then-binding appellate precedent authorizing a search would be to "'penalize the officer for the appellate judges' error.'" (Id. at p. 2429.) Accordingly, the Davis court concluded: "We therefore hold that when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply." (Id. at p. 2434 .)