In FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) the Court held, in pertinent part, that the FDA lacked the authority to ban tobacco. Id., at 1303. There is nothing in that case, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, or in the other tobacco legislation that manifests a Congressional intent to preempt claims such as the plaintiff's here. The statues and regulations at issue in FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. do not occupy this field to an extent that manifests Congressional intent to preempt--in other words, to leave the states no room to supplement it. Indeed, the defendants' preemption argument would have more force if the Court had adopted the analysis of the four dissenting Justices, who concluded that Congress had delegated to the FDA the authority to ban tobacco. Id. at 1316-31. If nicotine was held to be a "drug" subject to FDA authority, with concomitant FDA authority to regulate or ban cigarette as a "combination product" designed to deliver nicotine to the body, it would be a strong indication of Congressional intent to occupy a field. In that case, the defendants' claim of preemption of state "regulation" through common law strict liability actions would be more compelling.