In Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, a 16-year-old murder suspect, with a lengthy juvenile record, responded to a Miranda advisement by asking if his probation officer could be present. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 710.) When the juvenile was told that was not possible, he waived his rights and made admissions. (Ibid.) Prior to trial, the juvenile sought unsuccessfully to exclude his admissions relying on the Burton case. The California appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 713, fn. 2.) Our California Supreme Court granted review, and by a divided vote, reversed the ruling, held, "the 'request to see his probation officer at the commencement of interrogation negated any possible willingness on his part to discuss his case with the police and thereby invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.'" (Id. at p. 713.) The court based this conclusion on its view that, because of the juvenile court system's emphasis on the relationship between a probation officer and the probationer, the officer was "'a trusted guardian figure who exercises the authority of the state as parens patriae and whose duty it is to implement the protective and rehabilitative powers of the juvenile court.'" (Id. at pp. 713-714.) It concluded the juvenile's request for his probation officer was the same as a request to see his parents, and thus under Burton's per se rule it constituted an invocation of the juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights. (Id. at p. 714.) In making this ruling, the court also expressly rejected the totality-of-the-circumstances test, noting, "'Our question turns not on whether the juvenile had the ability, capacity or willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver, and hence whether he acted voluntarily, but whether, when he called for his probation officer, he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege.'" (Id. at p. 715.) The United State Supreme Court granted review and reversed. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 724.) It concluded the California Supreme Court erred in finding a juvenile's request for his probation officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 724.) It upheld the waiver as valid, holding that only a specific request for an attorney is a per se invocation of the right to counsel. Other requests (for parents, trusted adults, or probation officers) are to be considered as part of applying the normal totality-of-the-circumstances test. (Id. at pp. 724-725.) The court concluded, "There is no reason to assume that such courts--especially juvenile courts, with their special expertise in this area--will be unable to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so as to take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved. Where the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent, the totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this into account in making a waiver determination. At the same time, that approach refrains from imposing rigid restraints on police and courts in dealing with an experienced older juvenile with an extensive prior record who knowingly and intelligently waives his Fifth Amendment rights and voluntarily consents to interrogation." (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 725-726.) The United States Supreme Court addressed whether a juvenile's request to speak to his probation officer constituted an invocation of his right to counsel pursuant to Miranda. The Court held that the juvenile's request did not constitute an invocation of his right to counsel and that it was therefore error to suppress the statements he made after his request. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 724.) The Court stated that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determining voluntariness applied "even where interrogation of juveniles is involved," reasoning that "the totality approach . . . mandates . . . inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation," such as "the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence . . . ." (Id. at p. 725.) The high court reviewed the California Supreme Court's holding "that a juvenile's request, made while undergoing custodial interrogation, to see his probation officer is per se an invocation of the juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights as pronounced in Miranda. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p.709.) The high court noted that the "pivotal rule" played by attorneys in the criminal justice system "justifies the per se rule established in Miranda, and that distinguishes the request for counsel from the request for a probation officer, a clergyman, or a close friend." (Id. at p. 722.) The court concluded that notwithstanding a relationship of trust between a juvenile and his probation officer, holding a request for a probation officer to be a per se invocation of Miranda "'would cut this Court's holding in that case completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale.'" (Id. at p. 723.) The Fare court held the California court had erred and instead, "the determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. " (Id. at pp. 724-725.) The court stated that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determining voluntariness applied "even where interrogation of juveniles is involved," reasoning that "the totality approach . . . mandates . . . inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation," such as "the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence . . . ." (Id. at p. 725.)