In Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), the Supreme Court limited this rule to postarrest, post-Miranda silence. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's remarks referring to postarrest, pre-Miranda silence do not necessarily violate a defendant's due process rights. The Court stated that in the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand. 455 U.S. at 607. Weir was arrested on charges of intentional murder stemming from a stabbing in a nightclub parking lot. At his trial, Weir took the stand in his own defense and admitted stabbing the victim, but claimed that he acted in self-defense. This was the first occasion Weir offered his version of the stabbing. The prosecutor cross-examined Weir as to why he had failed to offer this explanation when he was arrested. The jury ultimately convicted Weir of first-degree manslaughter. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held Weir was denied due process when the prosecutor used his post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes. Fletcher v. Weir, 658 F.2d 1126 (1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 603, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490, 102 S. Ct. 1309 (1982). The court concluded that Weir could not be impeached by his post-arrest silence even if no Miranda warnings were given, stating "an arrest, by itself, is governmental action which implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent." Id. at 1131. The Supreme Court reversed, noting unlike the defendant in Doyle, there was no evidence that Weir received any Miranda warnings during the period of his post-arrest silence. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 603. The Court found that "in the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand." Id. at 607.