In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) the Supreme Court considered whether a person arrested and held for trial on an information is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether an adversary hearing is required by the Constitution. The issue in Gerstein arose because, notwithstanding a Florida rule of criminal procedure that seemingly authorized adversary preliminary hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases, the courts there had held that the filing of an information foreclosed the accused's right to a probable cause hearing. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105-106, 95 S. Ct. at 859 (citing Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (before the amendment in 1972)). In Gerstein, the government defended the Florida procedure, arguing that the prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending trial. The Court rejected this argument, finding that "although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 118, 95 S. Ct. at 864. The Court reasoned: "A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the criminal law relies for its vindication. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343, 63 S. Ct. 608, 614, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943)." (Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 118, 95 S. Ct. at 865.) Thus, the Court concluded that the accused is entitled to, and the Fourth Amendment requires, a finding of probable cause by a detached and neutral judicial officer. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 119, 95 S. Ct. at 863, 865. The requirement for a probable cause finding, however, does not mean that the Fourth Amendment requires an adversary proceeding to determine whether probable cause exists. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized that: "the use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. This is not to say that confrontation and cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of probable cause determinations in some cases. In most cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determinations of probable cause." (Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121-122, 95 S. Ct. at 867.) For these reasons, the Court in Gerstein explicitly rejected the view that the probable cause determination must be made under an adversary process. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122-123, 95 S. Ct. at 867. The Supreme Court noted that a probable cause determination hearing is important to protect against "unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112. The court noted that prompt judicial determination of probable cause is important because "pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships." Id. at 114.