Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 22 U.S. 1 invalidated a discriminatory state regulation of shipping as applied to vessels federally licensed to engage in the coasting trade. Although its historic importance lies in its general discussion of the commerce power, Gibbons also provides substantial illumination on the narrower question of the intended meaning of the Licensing Act. Chief Justice Marshall first defined the broad reach of Congress' power over interstate commerce: "It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." It was held that the acts of the legislature of New York, granting to Livingston and Fulton exclusive rights to navigation, by steamboats, in the navigable waters within the jurisdiction of the State of New York, was repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution, in the course of the opinion Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said (p. 65): "Internal commerce must be that which is wholly carried on within the limits of a State; as, where the commencement, progress and termination of the voyage are wholly confined to the territory of the State. This branch of power includes a vast range of state legislation, such as turnpike-roads, tollbridges, exclusive rights to run stage-wagons, auction licenses, licenses to retailers and to hawkers and pedlers, ferries over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive rights to carry goods and passengers, by land or water. All such laws must necessarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and that between the States, as well as the trade among the citizens of the same State. But, although these laws do thus affect trade and commerce with other States, Congress cannot interfere, as its power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, which resides exclusively in the States." The case challenged a New York law intended to encourage development of steamboats by granting Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston the exclusive right to operate steam-powered vessels in all of the State's territorial waters. The right to navigate steamboats between Elizabethtown Point, N.J., and New York City was, by assignment from Fulton and Livingston, granted to Aaron Ogden. Thomas Gibbons began operating two passenger ferries in violation of Ogden's submonopoly. Gibbons' steamboats had been enrolled and granted "license . . . to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade" under the Enrollment and Licensing Act. (Id., at 203.) Ogden nevertheless obtained an injunction from the New York courts enforcing the monopoly by restraining Gibbons from running his ferries in New York waters. Chancellor James Kent rejected Gibbons' pre-emption claim based upon his federal licenses. Kent found that the sole purpose of the license was to "give to the vessel an American character," i. e., to establish its nationality as an American-flag ship. This would have reduced various duties and taxes assessed under federal law, but in Kent's view, it did not oust the power of the State to regulate the use of chattels within its borders. 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 156-159 (1819). The highest state courtaffirmed, ruling that "the only effect" of the license was "to determine the vessel's national character, and the rate of duties which she is to pay." 17 Johns. 488, 509 (1820). On appeal to this Court, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that the rights granted to Gibbons by federal law superseded the conflicting state-created rights asserted by Ogden. Marshall first considered the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. He concluded that "commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior," and that "the power of Congress . . ., whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States." (Id., at 196.) The Court next defined the nature of the commerce power: "the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." Ibid. Ogden's claim that the States may exercise concurrent power over commerce, or even exercise their police powers, where that exercise conflicts with express federal law was rejected. (Id., at 200-210.) The Court then turned to the question whether "the laws of New-York" did "come into collision with an act of Congress" so that "the acts of New-York must yield to the law of Congress." (Id., at 210.) Mr. Chief Justice Marshall found the conflict unquestionable: "To the Court it seems very clear, that the whole act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the construction of statutes, implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade." (Id., at 212.) The license granted to Gibbons under the Act "must be understood to be what it purports to be, a legislative authority to Gibbons' steamboat . . . `to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, for one year from this date.'" (Id., at 214.) The Court rejected Ogden's argument - and the holding of the New York courts - that the license "gives no right to trade; and that its sole purpose is to confer the American character." (Ibid.) Finally, the Court decided that the statutory phrase "coasting trade" encompassed the carriage of passengers for hire as well as the transport of goods. Id., at 215-219.