In Houston v. Moore (1820) 18 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court held that a state court had a concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to try a militia man who had disobeyed the call of the President, and to enforce the laws of Congress against such delinquent. (Id., at 31-32.) Justice Story believed that Congress' power to provide for the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the militia was, when Congress acted, plenary; but he explained that in the absence of congressional action, I am certainly not prepared to deny the legitimacy of such an exercise of state authority.(Id., at 52.) As to the Second Amendment, he wrote that it may not, perhaps, be thought to have any important bearing on this point. If it have, it confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns the reasoning already suggested. (Id., at 52-53.) In that case, the Supreme Court dealt with the argument that the basic constitutional policy underlying preemption was stated early in our history. The Supreme Court held that "in cases where the State governments have a concurrent power of legislation with the national government, they may legislate upon any subject on which Congress has acted, provided the two laws are not in terms, or in their operation, contradictory and repugnant to each other." As the court then saw it, if the Federal law and the State law - "correspond in every respect, then the latter is idle and inoperative; if they differ, they must, in the nature of things, oppose each other, so far as they do differ. If the one imposes a certain punishment for a certain offense, the presumption is, that this was deemed sufficient, and, under all circumstances, the only proper one. If the other legislature impose a different punishment, in kind or degree, I am at a loss to conceive how they can both consist harmoniously together." Mr. Justice Story wrote that successive prosecutions for a single act, even though by distinct sovereignties, eachacting under its own laws would violate both "the principles of the common law, and the genius of our free government." Mr. Justice Story stated: ". . . that no nation is bound to enforce the penal laws of another within its own dominions. The authority naturally belongs, and is confided, to the tribunals of the nation creating the offenses. . . ."