In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), the petitioner, who suffered from "Schizophrenia, paranoid type," was arrested for attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. He was then charged with attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison term of one year. Upon his acquittal by reason of insanity, the petitioner was committed indefinitely to a mental hospital, pursuant to a District of Columbia statute adopted by Congress to protect society and rehabilitate insane criminals. Id. at 356 n.2. After being hospitalized for more than one year, the maximum period he could have spent in prison if he had been convicted, the petitioner sought his release. In determining that the petitioner was not entitled to be released, the United States Supreme Court concluded: "We turn first to the question whether the finding of insanity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that these findings constitute an adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill person. . . . We cannot say that it was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination. The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness. . . . Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made in a civil-commitment proceeding. We do not agree with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not established by proof that a person committed a non-violent crime against property. This Court never has held that "violence," however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment. The precise evidentiary force of the insanity acquittal, of course, may vary from case to case, but the Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make classifications that fit every individual with the same degree of relevance." Id. at 363-66. In a footnote, the Supreme Court emphasized that "dangerousness" should not be equated with "violence": To describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the same as to both." It also may be noted that crimes of theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to escape the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal. Id. at 365 n.14. The defendant was arrested for attempted petty theft, a misdemeanor punishable by a year in jail. Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a psychiatric hospital for as long as the court and the psychiatric staff of the hospital deemed necessary. (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 359-360 & fn. 7.) At a statutorily-mandated release hearing 50 days later, at which the defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was no longer mentally ill or dangerous (id. at p. 357), a hospital psychologist testified that the defendant continued to be actively paranoid schizophrenic and remained a danger to himself and others. The court found that Jones was mentally ill and dangerous as a result of his illness and returned him to the hospital. (Id. at pp. 360-361.) More than a year later, at a second release hearing, Jones demanded either his unconditional release or a civil commitment trial at which the government bore the burden of proving him mentally ill and dangerous by clear and convincing evidence to a jury. (Ibid.) The trial court denied Jones's request for a full-fledged civil commitment trial, reaffirmed its findings from the 50-day hearing, and continued Jones's commitment as a person found not guilty by reason of insanity. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the trial court. (Id. at p. 361.) The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court rejected Jones's argument that, after Addington v. Texas (1979), his continued commitment violated due process because "the judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a finding of present mental illness and dangerousness and because it was established only by a preponderance of the evidence." (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 362.) Instead, the Court reasoned, "a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness." The finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed a criminal act indicates dangerousness. (Id. at p. 363.) Further, automatic commitment upon proof of mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence did not offend due process because the insanity acquittee himself advanced insanity as a defense, thereby diminishing the risk of an erroneous determination of mental illness. And, the fact that the defendant had committed a criminal act as a result of that mental illness eliminated the risk "that he is being committed for mere 'idiosyncratic behavior.'" (Id. at p. 367.) Under these circumstances, the Court found, it was not unreasonable for "Congress to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." (Id. at p. 366.) The Jones court concluded that the "concerns critical to our decision in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the same standard of proof in both cases. "Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Citation. The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity acquittees." (Id. at pp. 367-368.) In Jones v. United States (1983) the United States Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia statute that provided for the indefinite commitment of a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity and required him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was no longer insane or dangerous in order to be released. The court found that "a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment and the protection of society" (id. at p. 366) because the criminal act indicates dangerousness and the insanity acquittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness. (Id. at pp. 363-366.) Accordingly, the court held the federal constitution permits the government to confine a person found not guilty by reason of insanity to a mental institution "until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society." (Id. at p. 370.) The court rejected the notion that the person could not be hospitalized for a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if convicted, because the purpose of the commitment was not to punish the individual, but to treat him and protect the public. (Id. at p. 368.) "And because it is impossible to predict how long it will take for any given individual to recover--or indeed whether he ever will recover--Congress has chosen, as it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the patient's suitability for release." (Ibid.) In Jones v. United States (1983) the insanity acquittee bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was no longer mentally ill or dangerous. The Jones court observed, "The statute provides several ways of obtaining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for release, at which he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be released, with court approval, upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of service. Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing every six months at which he may establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to release." (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 356-357.) The Supreme Court considered a statute under which a criminal defendant may be acquitted by reason of insanity if his insanity is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 356.) An acquittal on this basis indicates a finding that the individual had committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense. (Id. at p. 363.) The acquittee can then be committed to a mental institution without a further commitment proceeding. (Ibid.) Under the challenged commitment scheme, insanity, if established, is presumed to continue until it can be shown that the defendant has recovered. (Id. at p. 364.) After the defendant's initial commitment, he or she is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his or her eligibility for release; however, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. (Id. at p. 357.) In rejecting a due process challenge to the statute, the Supreme Court explained that "'due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'" (Id. at pp. 367-368.) As to the initial commitment, the court held that the "preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity acquittees." (Id. at p. 368.) The court did not specifically address the requirement that the defendant prove the absence of mental illness in a subsequent proceeding for release. (See Jones v. United States, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 363, fn. 11.) The United States Supreme Court held that due process permitted Jones, who was civilly committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, to be confined in a mental institution until he regained his sanity or was no longer a danger to himself or the general public. (Id. at p. 370.) The court approved of a legislative scheme whereby the length of the commitment was indefinite subject to periodic review for suitability of release, noting that it was impossible to predict when or if a mentally ill person will recover. (Id. at p. 368.) Notably, the legislative scheme reviewed in Jones placed upon an inmate seeking release the burden of proving he or she is no longer mentally ill or dangerous by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 357.) The Supreme Court considered two important factors regarding indefinite civil commitment. First, it considered dangerousness as established by a criminal conviction obtained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 363-365.) Second, it considered mental illness as established by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee was insane at the time of his act. (Id. at pp. 366-368.) The United States Supreme Court upheld a statute permitting the automatic civil commitment of a criminal defendant who had obtained a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity by proving his mental illness in the criminal case by a preponderance of the evidence. The Jones court noted that the clear and convincing evidence standard was generally required to civilly commit a person because it was "inappropriate to ask the individual 'to share equally with society the risk' " of an erroneous adjudication of mental illness. (Id. at p. 367.) But the court found there was a diminished risk of error when the individual had affirmatively advanced and proven the mental illness as a defense in a criminal proceeding, and accordingly the preponderance of the evidence standard comported with due process for commitment of insanity acquittees. (Id. at pp. 367-368.) The United States Supreme Court held that due process permitted the confinement of Jones, who was civilly committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, to a mental institution until he regained his sanity or was no longer a danger to himself or the general public. The court approved of a congressional legislative scheme whereby the length of the commitment was indefinite subject to periodic review for suitability of release, noting that it was impossible to predict when or if a mentally ill person will recover. (Id. at p. 368.)