In Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991), the Supreme Court held that an individual attorney representing himself could not recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988, the attorney's fees provision for certain civil rights suits. 499 U.S. at 437-38, 111 S.Ct. 1435. The Court reasoned that "the word `attorney' assumes an agency relationship, and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award under 1988." Id. at 435-36, 111 S.Ct. 1435. The attorney's fees provision was designed, moreover, to "enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights." Id. at 436, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Congress wanted to "ensure the effective prosecution of meritorious claims," which is more likely when litigation decisions are informed by "the judgment of an independent third party." Id. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 1435. In Kay, the Supreme Court made crystal clear, however, that the exception for individual plaintiffs who represent themselves does not apply to organizations: "Petitioner argues that because Congress intended organizations to receive an attorney's fee even when they represented themselves, an individual attorney should also be permitted to receive an attorney's fee even when he represents himself. However, an organization is not comparable to a pro se litigant because the organization is always represented by counsel, whether in-house or pro bono, and thus, there is always an attorney-client relationship." Id. at 436 n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1435. In Kay, the Supreme Court extended the general principle that a pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney's fees under a similar fee-shifting provision to include a lawyer-litigant appearing pro se. See 499 U.S. at 437-38, 111 S.Ct. 1435. The Court determined that the overriding purpose of the fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. 1988 is to ensure the retention of "independent counsel" and a bona fide attorney-client relationship capable of promoting "effective prosecution of meritorious claims." Id. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 1435. That purpose applies equally to a lawyer proceeding pro se as to a layman. Id. As the Court noted, "even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation" because "he is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments." Id. Further, "ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for a lawyer proceeding pro se to appear as a witness." Id. Although Kay decided only the attorney's fee issue for a pro se lawyer-litigant, in a footnote the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to analogize his situation to the "organizations Congress intended to receive an attorney's fee even when they represented themselves" by noting that "an organization is not comparable to a pro se litigant because the organization is always represented by counsel, whether in-house or pro bono, and thus, there is always an attorney-client relationship." Id. at 436 n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1435. The Court said nothing to indicate what type of "organization" it meant except to describe its legal representative as either in-house or unpaid. Id.