In Kentucky v. Dennison (1860), 65 U.S. 66, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, construed the word "crime" in the phrase "treason, felony, or other crime" of this clause to include every offense, misdemeanor as well as felony. It was held that the word "crime" in the Federal Constitution includes every act forbidden and made punishable by law of the demanding state; the word "crime" itself includes every offense from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses including misdemeanors. The Supreme Court said: "This brings us to the examination of the clause of the Constitution which has given rise to this controversy. It is in the following words: "`A person charged in any state with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.' (Art. IV, 2 U.S. Const.) "Looking to the language of the clause, it is difficult to comprehend how any doubt could have arisen as to its meaning and construction. The words, `treason, felony or other crime', in their plain and obvious import, as well as in their legal and technical sense, embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by the law of the state. The word `crime' of itself includes every offense, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses, and includes what are called `misdemeanors', as well as treason and felony."