In Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012), the companion case to Missouri v. Frye, the United States Supreme Court again applied Strickland to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from plea negotiations. There, the defendant rejected a plea offer based on counsel's misadvice and was later convicted at trial. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. Because all parties had conceded before the United States Supreme Court that the defendant's counsel rendered deficient performance, the Court did not address the first prong of Strickland. Id. at 1384. In applying the second prong, the Court echoed Frye's holding: "In the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice." Id. Specifically, the Court held that where "ineffective advice led not to an offer's acceptance but to its rejection," in order to establish prejudice "a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed." Id. at 1385. The Court concluded that this standard was satisfied under the facts of that case. Id. at 1391. The Court rejected the argument that there can be no finding of prejudice arising from plea bargaining if the defendant is later convicted at a fair trial. See id. at 1385-88. The United States Supreme Court in Lafler then addressed the appropriate remedy. In Lafler, the Court explained that remedies for Sixth Amendment violations should be "tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." Id. at 1388. "Thus, a remedy must 'neutralize the taint' of a constitutional violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution." Id. at 1388-89. The United States Supreme Court explained that a defendant who declines a plea offer as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel and then receives a greater sentence at trial, might endure a "specific injury" that comes "in at least one of two forms," and the remedy should be tailored accordingly. Id. at 1389. The first category involves typical cases where "the charges that would have been admitted as part of the plea bargain are the same as the charges the defendant was convicted of after trial." Id. When this occurs, "the court may exercise discretion in determining whether the defendant should receive the term of imprisonment the State offered in the plea, the sentence he received at trial, or something in between." Id. In the second category, however, resentencing based on a conviction at trial alone is insufficient because it does not fully redress the constitutional injury. See id. This situation can arise, for example, where "an offer was for a guilty plea to a count or counts less serious than the ones for which a defendant was convicted after trial, or if a mandatory sentence confines a judge's sentencing discretion after trial." Id. "In these circumstances," the Court reasoned, "the proper exercise of discretion to remedy the constitutional injury may be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal." Id. Presuming the defendant accepts the offer, the trial court "can then exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed." Id. In Lafler, the defendant rejected the State's offer to dismiss two of his charges in exchange for a guilty plea. Id. at 1383. The United States Supreme Court held that the "correct remedy" under these facts was not to order specific performance of the original plea agreement, but "to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement" under the second category of available remedies. Id. at 1391. The Court left "open to the trial court how best to exercise that discretion in all the circumstances of the case." Id. With respect to the limits circumscribing the trial court's discretion, the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to set any such limits, instead stating "principles elaborated over time in decisions of state and federal courts, and in statutes and rules, will serve to give more complete guidance as to the factors that should bear upon the exercise of the judge's discretion." Id. at 1389. The Lafler Court noted two relevant considerations, however: (1) a court may take into account a defendant's expressed willingness, or unwillingness, to accept responsibility for his or her actions; (2) while it was not necessary to decide whether a judge is required to disregard any information concerning the crime that was discovered after the plea offer was made, the baseline of the positions the prosecution and defendant occupied prior to the rejection of the plea offer could be consulted. Id.