In Laidlaw v. Organ (1817) 15 U.S. 178, the facts were that the plaintiff, Organ, purchased from Laidlaw Company one hundred and eleven hogsheads of tobacco on February 19th, 1815. On the night of the eighteenth some gentlemen brought, to New Orleans from the British fleet, tidings that a treaty of peace had been signed at Ghent by the American and British Commissioners. This news was communicated to the plaintiff on the morning of the nineteenth. Thereupon, though it was Sunday, the plaintiff called at once on one of the members of the firm of Laidlaw Company, who was ignorant that peace between the United States and Great Britain had been concluded, and, without revealing to the vendors this information, purchased the tobacco at from thirty to fifty per cent less price than the article commanded as soon as the news of peace became generally known. There was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had asserted or suggested anything to the vendors calculated to impose upon them with respect to the news of peace, or to induce them to think or believe that it did not exist. The purchaser desired to buy a quantity of tobacco. He had known that the treaty of peace had been signed between this country and England, by reason of which the price of tobacco had advanced about fifty per cent. He went to the seller to buy several hogsheads of tobacco. During the conversation, the seller inquired if he had heard any news as to peace with England, or news which would tend to increase the price or value of tobacco. To that inquiry the buyer pretended not to hear, and made no reply. The seller asked for specific information, did not get it, and was deceived. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the buyer. In reversing the lower court, Chief Justice Marshall said: "The court is of the opinion, that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. But at the same time, each party must take care not to say or do anything tending to impose upon the other. The court thinks that the absolute instruction of the judge was erroneous, and that the question, whether any imposition was practised by the vendee upon the vendor, ought to have been submitted to the jury. For these reasons the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the district court of Louisiana, with directions to award a venire facias de novo." Chief Justice Marshall said: "The question in this case is whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the vendor? The Court is of opinion that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within the proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both. But at the same time, each party must take care not to say or do anything tending to impose upon the other." In that case, there was a verdict and judgment for the original plaintiff. The cause was carried into the Supreme Court on a bill of exceptions taken by the defendant, and the judgment was reversed on the absolute instructions of the court to the jury, the question upon which the case depended (a question of fact) not having been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court could do nothing else than award a venire facias de novo, because the court [below] not instructing the jury, and charging the jury to find for the plaintiff, there was no fact on the record by which they could infer the law.