In Maryland v. King (2013) U.S. 133 S.Ct. 1958, Alonzo King was arrested in 2009 and charged with first and second degree assault for menacing a group of people with a shot gun. (King, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 1965.) As part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses, King's DNA sample was taken via buccal swab. This DNA sample matched King with a 2003 cold case where a man concealing his face and armed with a gun broke into a woman's home in Salisbury, Maryland and raped her. (Ibid.) King filed a motion to suppress evidence, and the trial judge denied the motion. (Id. at p. 1962.) He was subsequently convicted of rape, which he appealed. (Ibid.) The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the taking of a buccal swab for DNA identification purposes violated King's Fourth Amendment rights as an unreasonable search of a person. (King, supra, 133 S.Ct at pp. 1965-1966.) Under Maryland law, Maryland's law enforcement is authorized to collect DNA samples from a person who is "charged" with a crime "of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt to commit burglary." (Md. Pub. Saf. Code Ann. 2-504(a)(3)(i) Under this law, once a DNA sample is taken, it is processed or placed in a database, unless the charges are unsupported by probable cause, then the DNA sample is destroyed. (King, supra, 133 S.Ct at p. 1967.) Any DNA sample's use is restricted to identification purposes only. (Ibid.) In King, the court held the search was taken in the context of an arrest, and, thus, "respondent's expectations of privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks." (King, supra, at p. 1980.) Further, the court held that the state had significant interest in obtaining the DNA identification in order for the appropriate person to be connected with the charges, and also to ensure that law enforcement and others in the criminal justice system could make informed decisions concerning pretrial custody. (Ibid.) Considering the minor intrusiveness, the significant state interest, and the procedural safeguards, the court concluded that the "DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." (Id. at p. 1980.) The court outlined the safeguards in place regarding use of the DNA sample including inter alia the fact that it was limited to identification only, it would be destroyed if probable cause was not found, and it was forbidden to test for familial matches. (King, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 1965.) In King, the United States Supreme Court moved beyond the realm of convicted offenders, rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Maryland statute requiring collection of DNA from arrestees charged with "serious crimes." King described the "legitimate government interest" served by the Maryland DNA law as "the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody." (Ibid.) The court viewed a suspect's "identity" as including not only "his name or Social Security number" but also his or her criminal history, the latter being "critical" for the police to know when processing a suspect for detention because "it is a common occurrence that 'people detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.'" For this purpose, the court stated, "the only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides." "DNA is another metric of identification used to connect the arrestee with his or her public persona, as reflected in records of his or her actions that are available to the police," producing "a more comprehensive record of the suspect's complete identity." (Ibid.) Employing this definition of "identity," the court saw DNA identification of arrestees as helping ensure safety in a custodial setting by allowing law enforcement officers to "know the type of person whom they are detaining" and "make critical choices about how to proceed." DNA information could help law enforcement assure an arrestee's availability for trial by indicating arrestees who had committed more serious offenses in the past and might be more inclined to flee in order to avoid investigation that could expose the other offenses. The information could also inform bail decisions, because an arrestee's "past conduct is essential to an assessment of the danger he poses to the public." Acknowledging that it may take some time to obtain the results of DNA testing, the court observed that actual release often does not occur for a considerable time after the decision to release is made, information about the arrestee's "identity and background" could be relevant to conditions of release or reconsideration of the decision to release, and DNA results obtained after release on bail could lead to revocation. Finally, the court noted that identification of an arrestee as the perpetrator of another crime could result in freeing a different person wrongfully imprisoned for that other offense.