In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), a defendant contended his plea should be set aside because the trial court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by, among other things, failing to determine whether there was a factual basis for the plea. Id. at 463. While addressing whether this constituted an error, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "the procedure embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 has not been held to be constitutionally mandated." Id. at 465. The United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine the effect of a district court's failure to follow the provisions of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11, 1 the federal counterpart to HRPP Rule 11. The Supreme Court noted that there were two purposes for Rule 11: First, although the procedure embodied in Rule 11 has not been held to be constitutionally mandated, it is designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary. Second, the Rule is intended to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas. . . . .These two purposes have their genesis in the nature of a guilty plea. A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his or her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his or her right to trial by jury, and his or her right to confront his or her accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. (McCarthy v. United States 394 U.S. 459, 465-66.) The Supreme Court then held: "To the extent that the district judge thus exposes the defendant's state of mind on the record through personal interrogation, he not only facilitates his own determination of a guilty plea's voluntariness, but he also facilitates that determination in any subsequent post-conviction proceeding based upon a claim that the plea was involuntary. Both of these goals are undermined in proportion to the degree the district judge resorts to "assumptions" not based upon recorded responses to his inquiries. For this reason, we reject the Government's contention that Rule 11 can be complied with although the district judge does not personally inquire whether the defendant understood the nature of the charge." Id. at 467. Having decided that Rule 11 had not been complied with, the Supreme Court next considered what effect the noncompliance had on the defendant's guilty plea. The Supreme Court concluded that "a defendant whose plea has been accepted in violation of Rule 11 should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew." Id. at 472. The Court reasoned that this holding "not only will insure that every accused is afforded those procedural safeguards, but also will help reduce the great waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the original record is inadequate." Id.