In Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011), Detroit police responded to a shooting call. They arrived at a gas station and found the victim, Covington, lying on the ground next to his car with a gunshot wound to the abdomen. He was in severe pain and had difficulty speaking. Police officers asked Covington "'what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.'" Id. at 1150. (quoting People v. Bryant, 483 Mich. 132, 143, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009)). Replying that "Rick" (the defendant) had shot him, Covington told the police that he had gone to Rick's house; had had a conversation with him through the back door; when he turned to leave, Rick shot him through the door; and he managed to get in his car and drive to the gas station where the police found him. The shooting had occurred approximately 25 minutes earlier. The police spoke to Covington for about 5-10 minutes, until medical personnel arrived at the scene. Covington died of his injuries. The Bryant Court held that Covington's statements to the police were non-testimonial. It observed that the case required "further explanation of the 'ongoing emergency' circumstance addressed in Davis v. Washington " in that it presented "a nondomestic dispute, involving a victim found in a public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound, and a perpetrator whose location was unknown at the time the police located the victim." Id. at 1156. Thus, the circumstances involved a potential threat to the police and the public at large that was not present in either case in Davis v. Washington. The Court emphasized that, in assessing whether a statement is testimonial in such a case, the ultimate inquiry is what was the primary purpose of the interrogation, i.e., was it to meet an ongoing emergency or to establish past events for purposes of a criminal prosecution? The existence of an "ongoing emergency" is relevant to whether a statement is testimonial because "an emergency focuses the participants on something other than 'prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.'" Id. at 1157 (quoting Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at 822) (alteration in Bryant). In so inquiring, a court must "objectively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter occur[red] and the statements and actions of the parties." Id. at 1156. Thus, the focus is not on the subjective or actual purpose or intent of the interrogator or the declarant, but on the "purpose that reasonable participants would have had" under the same circumstances. Id. Moreover, the circumstances must be evaluated based on the facts as known to the participants at the time of the encounter, not in hindsight. Finally, both the questions asked and the answers elicited are relevant in determining the primary purpose of the interrogation. The Bryant Court explained that "the existence and duration of an emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public." Id. at 1162. In the context of a domestic disturbance case (as in Davis), there is a "narrower zone of potential victims" and, ordinarily, the ongoing nature of the emergency will cease as soon as the victim is protected by police presence." Id. at 1158. When the context is a shooting by an unknown actor, however, the emergency may continue even after the threat to the first victim has been "neutralized." Id. Similarly, the type of weapon used may be relevant. A fist fight ends as soon as the participants are separated. When the weapon is a gun, however, the emergency may be ongoing until such time as the armed perpetrator has been apprehended. In Bryant, the victim was mortally wounded, the weapon was a gun, and the perpetrator was unknown to the police. Further, any motive for the shooting was unknown, leaving open the possibility that the shooter might be looking for Covington or that there could be other potential victims. The situation was "fluid and somewhat confused" and the questioning of Covington lacked any formality. Id. at 1166. All of these facts, viewed in their totality and objectively, led the Court to conclude that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to respond to an ongoing emergency. Accordingly, Covington's statements were non-testimonial and properly were admitted into evidence under a hearsay exception.