In Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), the Supreme Court applied the three-part test from Brown v. Texas and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte in holding that a state's use of a highway sobriety checkpoint does not per se violate the Fourth Amendment and that the checkpoint in question was lawful. Id. at 450-55. In finding an important state interest, the Court proclaimed, "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." Id. at 451. The Court had before it data showing that the checkpoint resulted in about 1.6 percent of drivers stopped being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and an expert testified that the average of arrests for drunk driving in sobriety checkpoints around the country was around one percent. Id. at 455. Even though these percentages were small, the Court refused to inject its judgment of appropriate law enforcement techniques over that of law enforcement officials, saying that there are several methods of addressing the drunk driving problem and that "the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers." Id. at 453-54. Based on these percentages, the Court found the checkpoint to be effective. Id. at 455. The Court also found the intrusion on the motorists to be slight. Id. at 451. The checkpoint was established pursuant to a sobriety checkpoint pilot program developed by the Michigan Department of Police. Id. at 447. As required by the established guidelines, all vehicles passing through the checkpoint were stopped and the drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. Id. If the driver exhibited no signs of intoxication, the vehicle was permitted to resume its journey. Id. If signs of intoxication were detected, the driver was directed to a location out of the flow of traffic where further investigation occurred. Id. After examining all of these factors, the Supreme Court determined that the factors weighed in favor of the constitutionality of the checkpoint. Id. at 455. The Court applied the Brown v. Texas test in upholding the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint program conducted by the Michigan State Police. In Sitz, the sole issue was whether the initial stop of each motorist and the associated questioning and observation by checkpoint officers violated the Fourth Amendment. 496 U.S. at 450-51, 110 S.Ct. at 2485. In striking a balance between the competing interests, the Court held that the Michigan sobriety checkpoint program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 455, 110 S.Ct. at 2488. In that decision, the director of the Michigan State Police appointed a sobriety checkpoint advisory committee to create guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. Under the guidelines, all vehicles passing through the checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. If the checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a location out of the flow of traffic where an officer would check the motorist's driver's license and car registration and, if warranted, the officer would conduct further sobriety tests. If the field tests and the officer's observations suggested the driver was intoxicated, an arrest would be made. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately. At the time of the decision in Sitz, only one checkpoint had been operated under the program. During its 75-minute duration, two out of the 126 vehicles stopped at the checkpoint were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The average delay for each vehicle was 25 seconds on average. In applying Brown v. Texas to the situation in Sitz, the Court found that the first factor of the test was satisfied due to the States' grave interest in eradicating drunken driving. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451, 110 S.Ct. at 2485-86. The Court also determined that the Michigan checkpoint program effectively furthered that interest where the checkpoint resulted in the arrests of two drunk drivers out of the 126 drivers stopped. Id. at 454, 110 S.Ct. at 2487. In evaluating the third factor of the Brown test, the Court weighed the "objective" and "subjective" intrusion on motorists who were briefly stopped at the checkpoint. The Court considered the objective intrusion on motorists to be minimal due to the brief duration of the seizures and the limited scope of the officers' investigation. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52, 110 S.Ct. 2486. The subjective intrusion on motorists was found to be reasonable where the checkpoint was selected pursuant to guidelines, and uniformed police officers stopped every approaching vehicle. Id. at 453. Thus, the Court found the degree of interference with individual motorists stopped at the checkpoint was "slight." Id. at 451, 110 S.Ct. at 2486. In Sitz, the checkpoint served the state's indisputable interest in deterring drunk driving.