New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) involved a dispute between Maine and New Hampshire with respect to the boundary "along the inland stretch of the Piscataqua River...." Id. at 746. New Hampshire brought an original action against Maine, "claiming that the Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore and that the entire river and all of Portsmouth Harbor belong to New Hampshire." Id. at 745. Relying on judicial estoppel, Maine moved to dismiss the case. It argued that the river boundary was "definitively fixed" at "the middle of the river's main channel of navigation," id. at 745, based on a 1740 decree issued by King George II, and a 1977 consent judgment entered by the Supreme Court in connection with litigation between the same states concerning lobster fishing rights and "the 'lateral marine boundary.'" Id. at 746. The Supreme Court agreed and granted Maine's motion. Id. In New Hampshire v. Maine, New Hampshire invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by bringing an action against Maine to establish New Hampshire's boundary with Maine as being along the shore of Maine. Maine moved to dismiss the case on the ground of judicial estoppel, arguing that the boundary line already had been affixed as in the middle of the Piscataqua River, which runs between the two states, as determined by the Supreme Court in a 1977 consent judgment entered in a previous boundary dispute between the states. The Court observed that while it had not had occasion to discuss the doctrine of judicial estoppel in depth, other courts had "uniformly recognized that its purpose is 'to protect the integrity of the judicial process.'" 532 U.S. at 749. Noting that "'the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may be appropriately invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle,'" id. at 750 (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)), the Court pointed to three factors that typically inform the decision of whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case: First, a party's later position must be "clearly inconsistent" with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create "the perception that the first or the second court was misled." Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party's later inconsistent position introduces no "risk of inconsistent court determinations," and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity. A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. Id. at 750-51.The 1977 consent decree was predicated, in part, on the 1740 decree, which located the river boundary at the "Middle of the River." Id. Ruling that New Hampshire was judicially estopped "from asserting -- contrary to its position in the 1970's litigation -- that the inland Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore," id. at 749, the Supreme Court said: "'Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.'" Id. Further, the Court explained that the "rule of judicial estoppel, 'generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.'" Id. (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8, 147 L. Ed. 2d 164, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000)). In concluding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred New Hampshire's case, the Court reasoned: The record of the 1970's dispute makes clear that this Court accepted New Hampshire's agreement with Maine that "Middle of the River" means middle of the main navigable channel, and that New Hampshire benefited from that interpretation. . . . Although New Hampshire now suggests that it "compromised in Maine's favor" on the definition of "Middle of the River" in the 1970's litigation, . . . that "compromise" enabled New Hampshire to settle the case . . . on terms beneficial to both States. Notably, in their joint motion for entry of the consent decree, New Hampshire and Maine represented to this Court that the proposed judgment was "in the best interest of each State." Relying on that representation, the Court accepted the boundary proposed by the two States. In short, considerations of equity persuade us that application of judicial estoppel is appropriate in this case. Having convinced this Court to accept one interpretation of "Middle of the River," and having benefited from that interpretation, New Hampshire now urges an inconsistent interpretation to gain an additional advantage at Maine's expense. Were we to accept New Hampshire's latest view, the "risk of inconsistent court determinations," . . . would become a reality. We cannot interpret "Middle of the River" in the 1740 decree to mean two different things along the same boundary line without undermining the integrity of the judicial process. (Id. at 752, 755.) The Court also said: Several factors typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case: First, a party's later position must be "clearly inconsistent" with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create "the perception that either the first or the second court was misled." Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party's later inconsistent position introduces no "risk of inconsistent court determinations," and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity. A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that it was "not establishing inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel." Id. at 751. To the contrary, it observed that "additional considerations may inform the doctrine's application in specific factual contexts." Id.