In New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000), the State of New York lodged a detainer under the IAD against an Ohio prisoner. The prisoner requested disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD. The prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to a trial date outside the time limits of the IAD. The defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the IAD's time limit had expired. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the defendant waived his rights under the IAD when his defense counsel agreed to a trial date beyond the statutory period. In commenting on the IAD, the Court said, "No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendant's assent to delay on the applicable time limits." Hill, 528 U.S. at 113. After discussing the availability of waiver, the Court stated that "for certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel." Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. The Court found that the IAD specifically contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. In concluding that counsel may indeed agree to a specified delay in trial, the Court explained: "When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendant's case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose." Hill, 528 U.S. at 115. The Court hereby recognized that a defendant's lawyer must have full authority to manage the trial and stated that "absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last." Id. The Court concluded that scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. The Court finally held that defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the IAD period barred the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within the statutory period. In Hill, defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed to a trial date outside the time limits of the IAD. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, the defendant argued the IAD seeks to limit situations in which delay is permitted by explicitly providing for "good-time continuances." Permitting other extensions of the time limits, he said, would override those limitations. The Court reasoned that "it is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured," but determined that was not the case under those circumstances. Hill, 528 U.S. at 116. The Court explained "necessary or reasonable continuance" as being the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendant's objection. The Court summed up by stating, "The specification in that provision that the 'prisoner or his counsel' must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense." Hill, 528 U.S. at 116. The Court determined that waiver is indeed available and that agreement by the parties to an extension constitutes a good-cause continuance.