In Ogden v. Saunders (1827) 25 U.S. 213, a citizen of New York, drew bills on Ogden in New York, which were accepted and protested there. Ogden was afterwards discharged under the insolvent laws of New York, passed previous to the contract of acceptance, and pleaded this discharge to an action brought against him in the District Court for Louisiana. A majority of the court there decided: (1) "That a bankrupt or insolvent law of any State, which discharges the person of the debtor and his future acquisitions, is not a. law impairing the obligation of contracts, so far as it respects debts subsequent to the passage of such law." (2) "That a certificate of discharge under such a law cannot be pleaded in bar of an action brought by a citizen of another State." In that case the parties were citizens of different states; and the decision of the court was, that as between parties of different states, the state insolvent laws had no application. Mr Justice Johnson, who delivered the opinion of the court, uses very strong language on this point, and which cannot be misunderstood. "All this mockery of justice," says he, "and the jealousies, recriminations and perhaps retaliations which might grow out of it, are avoided, if the power of the states over contracts, after they become the subject exclusively of judicial cognizance, is limited to the controversies of their own citizens. The Supreme Court held that the states retained the power and could exercise it by law, and that the law would operate to discharge the contract between debtor and creditor; they being inhabitants of the particular state at the date of the proceeding, if the contract had been made there after passing the law. In such case the parties contracted subject to the law, and it entered into the contract. In Ogden v. Saunders, in speaking of bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, it was said: "`The first two of these prohibitions apply to laws of a criminal, and the last to laws of a civil character.' "And such is the uniform construction given by all the authorities. "The ordinance in question punishes no past act committed, done or suffered to be done by appellant. It simply furnishes a standard applicable to all persons, by which their fitness to conduct a business, in itself dangerous to the morals and good order of the city, shall be measured. . . . "But appellant contends that the ordinance properly construed applies only to those who have, since its adoption, violated its provisions. But this construction cannot be sustained. The language is too explicit to admit it. Though not an ex post facto law, it is retrospective in so far as it determines from the past conduct of the party his fitness for the proposed business. Felons are also excluded from obtaining such license, not as an additional punishment, but because the conviction of a felony is evidence of the unfitness of such persons as a class; nor can we perceive why such evidence should be more conclusive of unfitness were the act done after the passage of the ordinance than if done before." The Court held that insolvency laws enacted by states cannot extend beyond their own limits and act upon the rights of citizens of other states, is made the basis of the decision. It was held that the plaintiff was not bound by the terms and conditions of a bank reorganization perfected under the 1925 statute.