In Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson (1830) 28 U.S. 433, Justice Story made a classic explanation of what was meant by "common law" when he said: ". . . By common law they meant what the constitution denominated as the third article `law;' not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those, where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered; or where, as in admiralty, a mixture of public law, and of maritime law and equity was often found in the same suit . . . In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights." In Parsons v. Bedford, where the trial was had in Louisiana, in which State the appellate court may freely examine and correct a jury's verdict, the Constitution was quoted as above, and it was said the only modes known to the common law to re-examine facts tried by a jury were in the grant of a new trial by the trial judge, or the award of a venire facias de novo by an appellate court for some error of law in the proceedings; and that the Louisiana appellate procedure could not obtain in the federal Supreme Court, notwithstanding a federal conformity statute. Mr. Justice Story, writing for the Supreme Court, after a careful analysis of Article 3 of the Constitution, the Seventh Amendment, and certain earlier acts of Congress, pointed out that "the phrase `common law', found in this clause, is used in contra distinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence", saying further "it is well known that in civil causes, in courts of equity and admiralty, juries do not intervene, and that courts of equity use the trial by jury only in extraordinary cases to inform the conscience of the court. The Court held that the Act of Congress which authorized United States District Judges to adopt the practice and modes of proceedings of the various States did not authorize the Federal courts to review a verdict of a jury although an appellate court of Louisiana could review a verdict and grant a new trial, saying: "`No fact, tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examinable, in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.' This is a prohibition to the courts of the United States to re-examine any facts tried by a jury, in any other manner. The only modes known to the common law to re-examine such facts, are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or to which the record was properly returnable; or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings." Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the United States Supreme recognized in clear terms the fundamental nature of the right to trial by jury in civil cases. He said: "The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy. The right to such a trial is, it is believed, incorporated into and secured in every State constitution in the Union; and it is found in the constitution of Louisiana. One of the strongest objections originally taken against the Constitution of the United States, was the want of an express provision securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases. As soon as the Constitution was adopted, this right was secured by the seventh amendment of the Constitution proposed by Congress; and which received an assent of the people so general as to establish its importance as a fundamental guarantee of the rights and liberties of the people."