In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 115 S. Ct. 1585, 131 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1995) the Court stressed that the free flow of commercial information is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system' because it informs the numerous private decisions that drive the system. Indeed ... a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.' Id. In Coors Brewing, the government sought to justify the legislation by asserting the federal government's interest in "facilitating" state efforts to regulate alcohol. The Court rejected this asserted interest: We conclude that the Government's interest in preserving state authority is not sufficiently substantial to meet the requirements of Central Hudson. Even if the Federal Government possessed the broad authority to facilitate state powers, in this case the Government has offered nothing that suggests that States are in need of federal assistance. Id. The Court held that a regulation banning beer labels from displaying alcohol content violated the First Amendment for similar reasons, namely because the regulation banned information about alcohol content on beer labels but not in advertisements. 514 U.S. at 488, 115 S.Ct. 1585. Just as "the failure to prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in advertising, which would seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any strength war than labels, made no rational sense if the Government's true aim was to suppress strength wars," id., the failure to ban providers from distributing confusing information about the tax through flyers, separate mailings or advertisements, which would seem to be more confusing than a single separate line item, makes little sense if the Commonwealth truly aims to curb the distribution of confusing information to consumers, see also Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-96, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977). The Court held that "While the regulation bans the disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels, it allows the exact opposite in the case of wines and spirits.... If combating strength wars were the goal, we would assume that Congress would regulate disclosure of alcohol content for the strongest beverages as well as for the weakest ones." Coors, 514 U.S. at 488, 115 S.Ct. 1585.