In Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), a police officer pursued teenagers on a motorcycle at speeds reaching 100 miles per hour, when they refused to obey his command to stop. When the motorcycle made a sharp turn, one of the teenagers fell off and was killed when the officer was unable to stop his car in time and struck the teen. In acknowledging the availability of a substantive due process claim where there is an executive abuse of power, the Court held that a "cognizable level of executive abuse of power is that which shocks the conscience." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708. While noting that "liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process," the Court observed that it is a "closer call" whether "the point of the conscience shocking is reached when injuries are produced with culpability falling within the middle range, following from something more than negligence but less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708.; see also Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir.1998). As applied to high-speed police pursuits, the Court held that "highspeed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under 1983." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854, 118 S.Ct. 1708. The Court acknowledged, however, that circumstances are important in evaluating the existence of a substantive due process claim: "Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking." Id. at 850, 118 S.Ct. 1708. Thus, "when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer's instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates the large concerns of the governors and the governed." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853, 118 S.Ct. 1708.