In Sheldon v. Sill (1850) 49 U.S. 441, the petitioner challenged whether the Judiciary Act of 1789, as enacted by the Congress, could refuse to vest in lower federal courts the entire grant of diversity jurisdiction as authorized by the Article III of the Constitution, quoted above, which extends judicial power to all diversity cases. The Court upheld the statute and opined "it must be admitted, that if the Constitution had ordained and established the inferior courts, and distributed to them their respective powers, they could not be restricted or divested by Congress." (Id. at 448.) However, because the Constitution did not do this, the Court concluded that the Congress may withhold from any court of its creation the jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. In sum, inferior courts that are created by statute can have no jurisdiction other than that which the statute confers. In that case, a bill in equity had been filed in the Circuit Court of the United States by the assignee of a bond and mortgage for a decree of sale of the mortgaged premises. The mortgagor and mortgagee were both citizens of Michigan and the assignee was a citizen of New York. It was held that the court had no jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Grier saying: "The term `chose in action' is one of comprehensive import. It includes the infinite variety of contracts, covenants, and promises, which confer on one party a right to recover a personal chattel or a sum of money from another, by action." The Supreme Court in holding that the Congress having the power to establish the Courts must define their respective jurisdictions and that the Congress having a right to prescribe may withhold from any Court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies and further: "The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised by the Circuit Court; consequently, the statute which does prescribe the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be in conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not enumerated therein." It was contended, in favor of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, that the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789, inhibiting a suit by an assignee of a chose in action, in cases where the assignor could not have sued, if no assignment had been made, was invalid, because it attempted to deprive the courts of the United States of the judicial power with which the Constitution had invested them; but this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Grier, said: "The eleventh section of the Judiciary Act, which defines the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, restrains them from taking `cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note, or other chose in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the contents, if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.'