In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), a handicapped person with a serious hearing disability challenged the denial of her admission to a nursing program as a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. That legislation prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified handicapped individual in a federally funded program solely by reason of his handicap, but does not require more than evenhanded treatment of handicapped and nonhandicapped by state agencies. As the court explained, "neither the language, purpose, nor history of 504 (of the Rehabilitation Act) reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation on all recipients of federal funds." 442 U.S. at 411, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. The Supreme Court held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not give federal agencies the power to impose such onerous affirmative burdens on local programs. In Davis, a deaf woman applied to Southeastern Community College's registered nurse program. After evaluation of the extent of her handicap by an audiologist, the school rejected her application. The audiologist reported that, even with a hearing aid, Davis would be unable to understand speech directed to her except through lipreading. The school concluded that her deafness would preclude her participation in the clinical portion of the nursing program and that she would not be able to perform effectively as a nurse in a variety of situations. Davis argued that the denial of her application was improper for two reasons. First, the school should not have taken her handicap into account in determining whether she was "otherwise qualified" for admission under the standard of section 504. Second, the school should have restructured the program so that her handicap would not bar her participation. The Court upheld the validity of the school's action against both challenges. On the first, the Court held that an "otherwise qualified" person is one who is able to meet all program requirements, including necessary physical qualifications, despite his handicap. Id. at 406-07, 99 S.Ct. at 2367. In response to the second argument, the Court held that section 504 does not require such substantial program modifications. In analyzing the second issue, the Court noted that "(t)he language and structure of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reflect a recognition by Congress of the distinction between the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicap." Id. at 410, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. The Court concluded that "neither the language, purpose, nor history of 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation of all recipients of federal funds." Id. at 411, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. In reply to the plaintiff's argument that HEW regulations might put a burden on Southeastern not imposed by the statute itself, the Court responded that if HEW had "attempted to create such an obligation itself, it lack(ed) the authority to do so." Id. at 411-12, 99 S.Ct. at 2370. In holding that section 504 bans discrimination but does not mandate affirmative action to accommodate the handicapped, the Court recognized that the line between impermissible discrimination and optional affirmative action is a fine one. In some situations, "insistence on continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program." Id. at 412, 99 S.Ct. at 2370. And failure to take affirmative action might be discriminatory when programs could be opened to the handicapped "without imposing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State." Id.