In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), the plaintiff Campbell sued his insurer, State Farm. Campbell had killed one person and permanently disabled another in an auto accident. Id. at 412. State Farm refused to settle the claims, despite the fact that its investigators knew that Campbell was at fault and had recommended settlement. Id. at 413. State Farm promised Campbell that it would cover him in the event of an excess liability judgment and further promised him that his assets would be safe. Id., 123 S. Ct. at 1518. Campbell lost at trial and State Farm reneged on its promise to pay the judgment. Id. State Farm suggested to Campbell, instead, that he put up a "for sale" sign at his house. Id. Campbell sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. At trial against State Farm, the jury awarded Campbell $ 1 million in compensatory damages and $ 145 million in punitive damages. Id. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to $ 25 million. Id., 123 S. Ct. at 1519. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $ 145 million punitive damages award, finding the defendant's conduct reprehensible. Id. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Campbell Court reversed the Utah court, finding that the punitive damages award violated due process. Id. The Court further elucidated the three BMW factors (BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore) in determining an appropriate punitive damage award. While there is still no bright line mathematical formula, a single digit multiplier ratio between compensatory and punitive damages will often satisfy due process. Id. at 424-25. Since there is no firm benchmark, a particularly egregious act may warrant a higher ratio. Id. In State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, the Court reiterated that the most important factor in determining the reasonableness of a punitive damage award is the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. Physical as opposed to economic harm, conduct evincing a disregard for the safety of others, financial vulnerability of the target, conduct involving repeated actions, and harm that is the result of intentional malice all indicate a higher degree of reprehensibility and support a larger punitive damage award. Id. The Court was admonished of the constitutional constraints imposed on punitive sanctions. In Campbell, the Supreme Court instructed: "while States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. The reason is that 'elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.' To the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property." Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416-417 . Of further concern to the Court was the fact that: "jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences . . . . Our concerns are heightened when the decisionmaker is presented . . . with evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded. Vague instructions, or those that merely inform the jury to avoid 'passion or prejudice' . . . do little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of assigning appropriate weight to evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory." Id. at 417-418.In sum , in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell the insureds brought an action against their insurer, State Farm, to recover for bad-faith failure to settle within the policy limits and damages for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury awarded the insureds $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award. The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed the punitive damages award because it found it to be "neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed," and "an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429, 123 S. Ct. at 1526. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court discussed the type of evidence that may be admitted in proving the appropriateness of punitive damages. The insureds in Campbell sought to show the reprehensible conduct of State Farm by introducing evidence of State Farm's business practices for over 20 years in numerous states. The Court found this evidence to be improper. First, the Court said that "a State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred." 538 U.S. at 421, 123 S. Ct. at 1522. The Court explained, however, that: "Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff. A jury must be instructed, furthermore, that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred." 538 U.S. at 422, 123 S. Ct. at 1522-23 . Second, the Court expounded that, as a general rule, a State has no legitimate concern "in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction. Any proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to other persons would require their inclusion, and, to those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would need to apply the laws of their relevant jurisdiction." 538 U.S. at 421-22, 123 S. Ct. at 1522 . The Court's conclusion that improper evidence was admitted in Campbell was based on its finding that: "The courts awarded punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the insureds' harm. A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business." 538 U.S. at 422-23, 123 S. Ct. at 1523. The Court further explained: "The insureds have identified scant evidence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured them. Nor does our review of the Utah courts' decisions convince us that State Farm was only punished for its actions toward the insureds. Although evidence of other acts need not be identical to have relevance in the calculation of punitive damages, the Utah court erred here because evidence pertaining to claims that had nothing to do with a third-party lawsuit was introduced at length. Other evidence concerning reprehensibility was even more tangential. For example, the Utah Supreme Court criticized State Farm's investigation into the personal life of one of its employees and, in a broader approach, the manner in which State Farm's policies corrupted its employees. The insureds' attempt to justify the courts' reliance upon this unrelated testimony on the theory that each dollar of profit made by underpaying a third-party claimant is the same as a dollar made by underpaying a first-party one. For the reasons already stated, this argument is unconvincing. The reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20-year period. In this case, because the insureds have shown no conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis." 538 U.S. at 423-24, 123 S. Ct. at 1523-24.