In State of Mississippi v. Johnson (1866) 71 U.S. 475, it was sought to restrain the president from prosecuting or carrying out the laws of congress known as the Reconstruction Acts. By those laws certain powers and duties were conferred upon the president. There, as here, the question involved the exercise of powers and duties under a legislative act. In the case, the supreme court of the United States was asked to restrain and enjoin Andrew Johnson, then President of the United States, and a citizen of Tennessee, from enforcing the acts of congress of March 2 and 23 1867, commonly known as the "Reconstruction Acts" on the ground that such acts were unconstitutional and void. Chief Justice Chase, speaking for the court, in the course of the opinion said: "Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President is the executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases subject to its cognizance." And, again, he says: "It is true that a state may file an original bill in this court. And it may be true, in some cases, that such a bill may be filed against the United States. But we are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us The motion for leave to file the bill is, therefore, denied." The Supreme Court said: "The single point which requires consideration is this: Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional?" The court held that the president could neither be commanded by the courts to perform any of the duties imposed upon him by the law nor restrained from performing them. There, as here, it was urged that the executive was required to perform only ministerial duties. The court defined a ministerial duty as "one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law." The courtinstances cases where the law required the performance of a single specific act and nothing was left to discretion or judgment. It was held that there was no difference between a suit to enforce action by the executive and one to restrain such action, as far as the question of judicial interference with the exercise of executive discretion is concerned. The Supreme Court said: "An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce the performance of such duties by the President might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, as 'an absurd and excessive extravagance.' " The Supreme Court held that the Judiciary would not attempt to control the President. It was determined that the President of the United States can not be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional; and the court refused to allow the filing of a bill designed to intercept the enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts. The case can be read narrowly to suggest that because the actions of the President in enforcing Congressional enactments are discretionary and not merely ministerial, the President may not be enjoined from carrying out a particular law.