In Stewart v. Kahn (1870) 78 U.S. 493, the Supreme Court considered the Act of June 11, 1864, c. 118 13 Stat. 123, "in relation to the limitation of actions in certain cases," and ruled that under it the time which elapsed while the plaintiff could not prosecute his suit by reason of the Civil War, whether before or after the passage of the act, was to be deducted from the operation of the statute of limitations; that the act applied to cases in the courts of the several states as well as those in the federal courts and was constitutional. There the suit was brought on a promissory note, upon which the local statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court said: "There is no prohibition in the Constitution against retrospective legislation of this character. We are of the opinion that the meaning of the statute is that the time which elapsed while the plaintiff could not prosecute his suit, by reason of the rebellion, whether before or after the passage of the act, is to be deducted. Considering the evils which existed, the remedy prescribed, the object to be accomplished, and the considerations by which the law-makers were governed - lights which every court must hold up for its guidance when seeking the meaning of a statute which requires construction - we cannot doubt the soundness of the conclusion at which we have arrived." The Supreme Court said: "Congress is authorized to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the granted powers. The measures to be taken in carrying on war and to suppress insurrection are not defined. The decision of all such questions rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the Constitution." The Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a federal statute that tolled limitations periods for state-law civil and criminal cases for the time during which actions could not be prosecuted because of the Civil War. The Supreme Court reasoned that this law was both necessary and proper to carrying into effect the Federal Government's war powers, because it "remedied the evils" that had arisen from the war. "It would be a strange result if those in rebellion, by protracting the conflict, could thus rid themselves of their debts, and Congress, which had the power to wage war and suppress the insurrection, had no power to remedy such an evil, which is one of its consequences." (Id., at 507.)