Stokes v. Saltonstall (1839)

Stokes v. Saltonstall (1839) 38 U.S. 181, was an action against a stagecoach owner to recover damages for an injury sustained by a passenger through the upsetting of the coach. The plaintiff and his wife were injured while leaping from a careening coach piloted by a drunken driver. (Id. at 182.) The defendant claimed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs which would have barred all recovery. (Id. at 187-88.) The trial court instructed the jury that "The facts that the carriage was upset, and the plaintiff's wife injured, are prima facie evidence that there was carelessness, or negligence, or want of skill on the part of the driver, and throw upon the defendant the burden of proving that the accident was not occasioned by the driver's fault;" and also, that it was incumbent on the defendant to prove that the driver was a person of competent skill and good habits, and that he acted on the occasion in question "with reasonable skill, and with the utmost prudence and caution." The judgment was sustained by the Supreme court against the contention (p. 193), that although the facts of the overturning of the coach and the injury sustained were prima facie evidence of negligence, they did not throw upon the defendant the burden of proving that the overturning and injury were not occasioned by the driver's default, but only that the coachman was a person of competent skill in his business, that the coach was properly made, the horses steady, etc. The United States Supreme Court approved the use of an early version of the sudden emergency instruction. Id. at 193. The court endorsed the doctrine wholeheartedly, stating: To enable the plaintiff to sustain the action it is not necessary that he should have been thrown off the coach; it is sufficient if he were placed by the misconduct of the defendant, in such a situation as obliged him to adopt the alternative of a dangerous leap, or to remain at certain peril; if that position was occasioned by the fault of the defendant, the action may be supported. On the other hand, if the plaintiff's act resulted from a rash apprehension of danger, which did not exist, and the injury which he sustained is to be attributed to rashness and imprudence, he is not entitled to recover. Id. at 193. A reading of the report shows that the case turned upon the high degree of care owing by carrier to passenger, and that the court did not rule that the circumstances of the occurrence shifted the burden of proof upon the main issue. The Court said, that although the carrier does not warrant the safety of the passengers, at all events, yet his undertaking and liability, as to them, go to the extent that he or his agents, where he acts by agents, shall possess competent skill, and, as far as human care and foresight can go, he will transport them safely.