In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) the United States Supreme Court set forth the test for determining when a new rule of constitutional law will be applied to cases on collateral review. The Teague court explained that "retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated." (Id. at p. 300.) According to Teague, "new rules should always be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, but ... generally they should not be applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review." (Id. at p. 303.) The court reasoned that collateral review is not designed as a substitute for direct review and that the government has a legitimate interest in having judgments become and remain final. (Ibid.) The Teague court articulated two exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity for new rules in cases on collateral review. First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.'" (Teague, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 307.) Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it "requires the observance of 'those procedures that ... are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'" (Ibid.) Thus "unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." (Id. at p. 310.) The Supreme Court held that its ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, was not retroactive as applied to a defendant, since his conviction became final two and a half years prior to the issuance of the Batson decision. The Court held, "application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect." (Teague, supra. at 309.) The Court held, however, that a new procedural rule must be applied retroactively on collateral review if it either (1) places "private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," or (2) constitutes a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure which is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." ( Id. at 311-312). The Court did not provide a list of which constitutional rules are considered "watershed." It noted, however, that if the rule "alters our understanding of a bedrock procedural element" and "vitiates the fairness" of a conviction, then the rule is considered a "watershed" rule. (Id.). The Court further stated that in order to be applied retroactively on collateral review, the new rule must "implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial," and must be a rule of procedure "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." (Id.). The Supreme Court later clarified that it is not enough under Teague to say that a new rule that is aimed at improving the accuracy of the trial is watershed. The United State Supreme Court set forth the procedure for deciding the applicability of a new rule on habeas corpus collateral review, which our supreme court expressly adopted as applicable to new rules under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. According to Teague, a new constitutional rule should always be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, but should never be applied retroactively on collateral review, barring exceptional circumstances. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-06. Teague sets out a three-step process for deciding the applicability of a new rule on collateral review. First, the court determines the date upon which the defendant's conviction became final. People v. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d 238, 741 N.E.2d 1103 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000), citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. "'A state conviction and sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certoriari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied.'" Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 741 N.E.2d at 1110, quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). Second, the court determines whether the constitutional rule sought by the defendant existed when the conviction became final. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 741 N.E.2d at 1110, citing O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. at 156, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 358, 117 S. Ct. at 1973. If the rule existed at the time the defendant's conviction became final, it is not a new rule. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 741 N.E.2d at 1110. In that case the rule is applied on collateral review, since it was the law that should have been utilized in the first place. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 741 N.E.2d at 1110. If the rule sought by the defendant is new, however, it is generally not to be applied on collateral review. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 741 N.E.2d at 1110. According to the Teague plurality, "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final" (Emphasis in original). Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, Third, Teaguedirects that if the rule is new, the court must determine whether it falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the Teague doctrine: (1) whether the rule in question places an entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law, or; (2) whether the new rule requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, i.e., the new rule must be aimed at improving the accuracy of trial and be of such importance that it alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to a fair trial. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 246-47, 741 N.E.2d at 1110-11, citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 211, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990). Unless one of the exceptions applies, the new rule should not be utilized on collateral review. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 741 N.E.2d at 1111.