Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist

In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, (1969), the students were suspended for wearing black arm bands to school as part of a protest against the Vietnam War. They engaged in no disorder or disturbance of the school's activities; there were not even any group demonstrations. The district court held that the school's action was reasonable because of a fear of disturbance from the students' actions. The Supreme Court rejected that rationale, pointing out that "in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbances is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom--this kind of openness--that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society." 393 U.S. at 508-09 . The Court held that, in order for the school officials to justify prohibiting a particular expression of opinion, they had to show something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that accompany unpopular viewpoints. Rather, they had to show that the forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. The Court held that the discipline of students for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War -- an action which caused no disruption -- violated their First Amendment rights. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that the wearing of the armbands was akin to "pure speech" that "is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06. However, the Court also said that it "has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. Specifically, the Court held: "A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13. The Court then turned to the record before it and pointed out that there was no evidence of interference with the school's work or the rights of others because of the wearing of the armbands. The Court said that an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression" and that school officials must demonstrate that their "action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09. According to the Court, "the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505. Consequently, it concluded that the students' rights had been violated. In Tinker the district court did not make such a finding, and there was no evidence to support it. Rather, the school officials simply wanted to avoid the controversy over the Vietnam War. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-10. That, however, was not permissible. "In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. Students may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved." Id. at 511. Those principles are not limited to supervised discussion in the classroom; personal intercommunication among the students is both an inevitable part of attending school and an important part of the educational process. A student may express opinions at school, even on controversial subjects, so long as he or she does so without materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline or colliding with the rights of others. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13.