In United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), the United States Supreme Court determined that the right to due process under the constitution of the United States does not prohibit a sentencing court from considering reliable evidence that a defendant testified dishonestly. The analysis in Grayson begins with a discussion of the prevailing approach to sentencing in the United States. Id. at 45-48. At the time, the prevailing approach demanded that judges evaluate each convicted defendant's potential for rehabilitation before assigning a sentence within some statutory range for the particular crime. Id. at 47-48. The court held that under the constitution of the United States, a sentencing judge may properly consider evidence that the defendant testified dishonestly, in order to assess his or her potential for rehabilitation. Id. at 53-55. The court reaffirmed this position even after federal sentencing guidelines were later enacted, greatly reducing federal judges' discretion in sentencing. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S. Ct. 1111, 122 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1993). The United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's truthfulness while on the stand is a relevant consideration in sentencing: A defendant's truthfulness or mendacity while testifying on his or her own behalf, almost without exception, has been deemed probative of his or her attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and hence relevant to sentencing. Soon after Williams was decided, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the attitude of a convicted defendant with respect to his or her willingness to commit a serious crime perjury is a proper matter to consider in determining what sentence shall be imposed within the limitations fixed by statute." Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875, 878 (1951). The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have since agreed. See n.3, supra. Judge Marvin Frankel's analysis for the Second Circuit is persuasive: "The effort to appraise 'character' is, to be sure, a parlous one, and not necessarily an enterprise for which judges are notably equipped by prior training. Yet it is in our existing scheme of sentencing one clue to the rational exercise of discretion. If the notion of 'repentance' is out of fashion today, the fact remains that a manipulative defiance of the law is not a cheerful datum for the prognosis a sentencing judge undertakes. Impressions about the individual being sentenced -- the likelihood that he will transgress no more, the hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career, the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his society -- are, for better or worse, central factors to be appraised under our theory of 'individualized' sentencing. The theory has its critics. While it lasts, however, a fact like the defendant's readiness to lie under oath before the judge who will sentence him would seem to be among the more precise and concrete of the available indicia."United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (1974). Only one Circuit has directly rejected the probative value of the defendant's false testimony in his or her own defense. In Scott v. United States, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 377, 382, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (1969), the court argued that "the peculiar pressures placed upon a defendant threatened with jail and the stigma of conviction make his or her willingness to deny the crime an unpromising test of his or her prospects for rehabilitation if guilty. It is indeed unlikely that many men who commit serious offenses would balk on principle from lying in their own defense. The guilty man or woman may quite sincerely repent his or her crime but yet, driven by the urge to remain free, may protest his or her innocence in a court of law."