In United States v. Hudson Goodwin (1812) 11 U.S. 32, the question presented was whether circuit courts had the power to decide common-law criminal cases. The Supreme Court held that the federal courts could not recognize and punish common-law crimes in the absence of a specific federal statute. In that case the Supreme Court emphatically declared that the federal courts have no common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases. They are not "vested with jurisdiction over any particular act done by an individual in supposed violation of the peace and dignity of the sovereign power." Rather, "the legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence." The Court held that "certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution," powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." United States v. Hudson Goodwin, rested on the notion that: "The powers of the general Government are made up of concessions from the several states - whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The judicial power of the United States is a constituent part of those concessions - that power is to be exercised by Courts organized for the purpose, and brought into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the Courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts created by the general Government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general Government will authorize them to confer." (Id., at 33.) Thus, the Court in Hudson concluded: "It is not necessary to inquire whether the general Government, in any and what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its Courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative act, if it does not result to those Courts as a consequence of their creation." (Ibid.)