In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), the Supreme Court made it clear that there are three areas of knowledge that are of critical significance on the limitations issue. They are 1) knowledge of the existence of an injury; 2) knowledge of the cause of the injury; and 3) knowledge of the legal significance of the injury. The Supreme Court posed the question before it. The issue in this case is whether the claim "accrues" within the meaning of the Act when the plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause of his injury or at a later time when he also knows that the acts inflicting the injury may constitute medical malpractice. 444 U.S. at 113. The Court made it clear that the accrual of a cause of action does not depend on the third area of knowledge (legal significance) but does depend on the congruence of the first two (existence of injury and cause of injury). The injury to the patient in Kubrick was a loss of hearing. The cause of the injury was erroneous treatment with an antibiotic drug known as neomycin. The legal significance was that the doctor who administered the neomycin might have been liable for medical malpractice. The Supreme Court held that Kubrick's cause of action accrued in January of 1969 when he had become aware of "both his injury and its cause." 444 U.S. at 120. As of that time, he had both 1) been diagnosed with bilateral nerve deafness and 2) been informed that "it was highly possible that the hearing loss was the result of the neomycin treatment administered at the hospital." 444 U.S. at 114. The Court regularly referred to these threshold awarenesses in the plural. It is undisputed in this case that in January 1969 Kubrick was aware of his injury and its probable cause. 444 U.S. at 118. The Supreme Court reiterated that "since he was aware of these essential facts in January 1969," the cause of action accrued at that time and did not need to await his learning, two years later, that "the neomycin irrigation treatment had been improper." 444 U.S. at 121. The medical awareness and the legal awareness were two distinct things subject to two distinct treatments. We are unconvinced that for statute of limitations purposes a plaintiff's ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment. 444 U.S. at 122.