In Ware v. Hylton (1796) 3 U.S. 199, the treaty in question was the British treaty of 1783, which terminated the war of the American Revolution. It was made while the Articles of Confederation subsisted. The Constitution, when adopted, applied alike to treaties "made and to be made." The rigorous doctrine of the elder jurists was emphatically asseverated by some of the judges, reluctantly admitted by others and denied by none. Judge Chase (who was one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence), speaking of the Revolution of 1776, says that before the Declaration of Independence, the contest was a civil war, but thereupon it become a public war, and each party became entitled to all the rights of public war. The other judges who delivered their opinions raised no question as to this. Justice Chase addressed the Treaty of 1783 that concluded the Revolutionary War. Two principles emerged: (i) The war-related claims of individual citizens can be asserted only by their government; (ii) all war-related claims, including those not explicitly addressed, are extinguished by the peace settlement: "I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for, British property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could only be provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these subjects, in the treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in courts of justice." (3 U.S. at 230.) The Court said: "If doubts could exist before the adoption of the present national government, they must be en-tirely removed by the sixth article of the Constitution, which provides t hat `all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established; and they had the power to change or abolish the State Constitutions or to make them yield to the general government and to treaties made by their authority. A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is, of all the United States, if any act of a State legislature can stand in its way. If the Constitution of a State (which is the fundamental law of the State and paramount to its legislature) must give way to a treaty and fall before it, can it be questioned whether the less power, an act of the State legislature, must not be prostrate? It is the declared will of the people of the United States that every treaty made by the authority of the United States shall be superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual State, and their will alone is to decide. If a law of a State contrary to a treaty is not void, but voidable only, by a repeal or nullification by a State legislature, this certain consequence follows, -- that the will of a small part of the United States may control or defeat the will of the whole." (Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199.)