Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679, was a landmark decision, it established some basic rules, defined various types of church property disputes, and recognized and classified types of church government consistent with the immediately previous discussion of polity. The case involved a Presbyterian church in Louisville, Kentucky that had divided into two factions during the Civil War, a proslavery faction, comprised of a majority of the congregation's ruling "elders," and an antislavery faction, composed of a majority of the church members. The antislavery faction brought an action to oust the proslavery elders from their control over church property. Meanwhile, the proslavery faction had joined forces with sympathizers in other congregations to form the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States, the hierarchy to which this faction now claimed allegiance. See I. Ellman, supra, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1385-86 (summarizing the facts of Watson). The Court overturned a decision by the lower court which had conducted a detailed inquiry into the adjudication of the dispute by higher church authorities. The court found that the proslavery elders had abandoned any rights they might have had in the church when they rejected the authority of the Presbyterian Church and joined the new pro-slavery church. In that case, the specific issue submitted to the court was which of two factions of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky, was the true owner of church property. There a schism in church membership had occurred because of the slavery issue. Specifically, those who were apparent loyalists to the Union and abolitionists on the slavery issue established a rule subsequent to the Civil War that those who had aided in the "rebellion" or who believed that slavery was a divine institution should be required to repent of their sins before they could be received back into the fold of church membership. In an effort to resolve the controversy the highest governmental organ of the Presbyterian Church, the General Assembly, declared the loyal faction to be the "true" Walnut Street Church. When the division persisted, the loyal group sought injunctive relief to assure its control over congregational property. The opposition group's argument was that the General Assembly's declaration respecting the slavery issue had exceeded its authority, since the constitution of the Presbyterian Church prohibited it from "meddling in civil affairs" and, consequently, the Assembly's power to "decide controversies" and to "suppress schismatical disputes" had not been exercised within the limits of its judicatory authority. The "non-loyal" faction had obtained relief in the state court of Kentucky. Avery v. Watson, 2 Bush 363, 65 Ky. 332 1868. Subsequently, however, the "loyal" faction found a diversity question and began litigation anew in the federal courts. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, held for the loyal faction. In Watson, Justice Miller also classified cases in which courts were asked to resolve disputes over church property into three basic catagories. First, the Court recognized cases where the dispute arose over property received by a religious institution conditioned upon the express terms of the granting instrument limiting the use and disposition of the property to the teaching, support and spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or belief. In this type of case the deed or conveying instrument expressly conditioned the use of the property. Secondly, it recognized cases where the property is held by a church of congregational or independent polity which "owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority." Id., 722. Third, the Court recognized cases where the ecclesiastical body holding or controlling the property was "a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization." Id., 722-3. In its decision, the Supreme Court also addressed the jurisdictional question, creating a separate standard for hierarchical churches and congregational churches. The Court classified three types of cases regarding the "rights to property held by ecclesiastical bodies." Id., 722. The first type of case involved title to property given to religious organizations by will or deed conditioned on the "teaching, support, or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or belief." Id. The court found no constitutional barriers to a court's consideration of such cases. Id. The second type of case "is when property is held by a religious congregation which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority." Id. The court found that the question before it did not fall into this category. This category involves "a strictly congregational or independent organization, governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by such other local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government . . ." Id., 724. As for these types of disputes, the Court held: "In such cases where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to use the property." Id., 725. In other words, the Court held that courts have jurisdiction over disputes within congregational churches. Id. The third type of case is "where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body . . . is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control . . ." Id., 722. The court held: "In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." Id., 727. The Court defined "judicatories" as ecclesiastical judicial bodies that "entertain appeals from the decisions of those below, and prescribe corrective measures in other cases." Id.