In Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, the United States Supreme Court held that by "assigning to the trial judge, not to the jury, authority to find the facts that expose a defendant to an elevated 'upper term' sentence," California's determinate sentencing law "violates a defendant's right to trial by jury safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." In People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, the California Supreme Court considered a Cunningham challenge in a factually analogous context. There, defendant pled no contest to six counts of violating section 288, subdivision (a). Defendant was sentenced to the upper term on one count based on the aggravating factor that he abused a position of trust. The appellate court affirmed the sentence. The high court reversed and remanded for resentencing. (French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 55.) It held that Cunningham applies to cases in which the defendant pled guilty or no contest and concluded that a waiver of the right to jury trial on the substantive offenses does not constitute a waiver of the right to a jury trial on any aggravating circumstances. Also, by entering into a plea agreement that includes the upper term as the maximum sentence, a defendant does not implicitly admit that his conduct could support that term. A defendant's stipulation to a factual basis for the plea constitutes an admission to the elements of the charged offenses only and not to any additional aggravating circumstances. Therefore, imposition of the aggravated term based solely on an offense-related factor that was not admitted or found true by a jury infringed defendant's jury trial right. (Id. at pp. 48-52.) Next, the high court determined that the error was prejudicial. It explained, "When a defendant pleads guilty or no contest, a prejudice assessment is even more problematic, because the record generally does not contain a full presentation of evidence concerning the circumstances of the offense." (Id. at p. 54.) In Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 127 S.Ct. 856, the court noted California's determinate sentencing law (DSL) and relevant sentencing rules "direct the sentencing court to start with the middle term, and to move from that term only when the court itself finds and places on the record facts--whether related to the offense or the offender--beyond the elements of the charged offense." (Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at p. 862.) Furthermore, "an upper term . . . may be imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating circumstance." (Id. at p. 868.) Cunningham held imposition of an upper term under California's determinate sentencing law, based on neither a prior conviction nor facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, stating: "California's determinate sentencing law (DSL) assigns to the trial judge, not to the jury, authority to find the facts that expose a defendant to an elevated 'upper term' sentence. The facts so found are neither inherent in the jury's verdict nor embraced by the defendant's plea, and they need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. The question presented is whether the DSL, by placing sentence-elevating factfinding within the judge's province, violates a defendant's right to trial by jury safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that it does." (Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at p. 860.) The Cunningham court reasoned: "As this Court's decisions instruct, the Federal Constitution's jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 (2005). 'The relevant "statutory maximum," ' this Court has clarified, 'is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.' Blakely, 542 U.S., at 303-304." (Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at p. 860.) The Cunningham court reversed the defendant's upper term because "the four-year elevation based on judicial factfinding denied petitioner his right to a jury trial." (Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at p. 860.) Cunningham concluded: "In accord with Blakely, therefore, the middle term prescribed in California's statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum." (Id. at p. 868.) Accordingly, Cunningham held: "Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt , the DSL violates Apprendi's bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, 'any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Ibid.) In Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court held that California's determinate sentencing law (DSL), by placing sentence-elevating fact finding within the trial judge's province, violates a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 127 S. Ct. at p. 860.) Cunningham explained that because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the DSL violates the bright-line rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490, that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 127 S. Ct. at p. 868.) Quoting Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303-304 for the proposition that " 'the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,' " the Cunningham court concluded that "in accord with Blakely, therefore, the middle term prescribed in California statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum." (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 127 S. Ct. at p. 868.)