In Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 572, the Court applied this statutory exception in considering whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The parties in the case--a doctor, a patient, and an insurance company--disagreed regarding the payment for medical services. The insurance agreement under which the doctor provided services to the patient contained a clause requiring arbitration of all payment disputes. The insurance company moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, and the insurance company appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the judgment was not final because other claims against the insurance company remained pending in the district court. On certiorari review, the Court held that the plain language of section 78-31a-19(1), the predecessor to section 78-31a-129, gave a party the right to seek review of any order denying a motion to compel arbitration "regardless of whether the order is a final judgment or has otherwise been designated as final by the district court."