In Lengyel v. Lint, 167 W. Va. 272, 280 S.E.2d 66 (1981), the appeal involved "questions relating to an action for fraud arising from a real estate transaction and the appropriateness of summary judgment in such a case." In dealing with issues surrounding the distinction between a "mobile home with additions" and a "modular home," the Court in Lengyel observed: "This alone created a genuine issue of fact. Which was it, a mobile home or a modular home, or are they the same thing? The question cannot be resolved on this record unless you accept the testimony of one party and ignore the testimony of another party. This is not the type of determination to be made on a motion for summary judgment." (Id. at 281, 280 S.E.2d at 71.) The Court expressed: "It is not essential that the defendant know for a fact that the statement or act alleged to be fraudulent is false. An action for fraud may lie where the defendant either knows the statement to be false, makes the statement without knowledge as to its truth or falsity, or makes it under circumstances such that he should have known of its falsity." (167 W. Va. at 277, 280 S.E.2d at 69.) The Lengyel Court also acknowledged that "this Court has also looked askance at what is commonly called 'dealers talk' or 'puffing' as an excuse for misrepresentations. . . ." (167 W. Va. at 277-78, 280 S.E.2d at 69.)