In Mays v. Chang, 213 W. Va. 220, 579 S.E.2d 561 (2003), a medical malpractice action, the Court held that because reasonable jurors could draw differing conclusions from blood test evidence, the trial court had committed reversible error by excluding evidence regarding whether the physician had a duty of care to administer blood tests to the patient. The Court explained: "During the trial, the circuit court completely excluded the appellant's evidence regarding whether the standard of care imposed upon appellee Dr. Chang a duty to perform blood tests, tests that might have shown Mr. Mays was anemic as a result of his colorectal cancer." 213 W. Va. at 223, 579 S.E.2d at 564 The lower court had ruled that "the appellant could not establish a causal connection between the appellee's failure to give Mr. Mays a CBC or hemoglobin a/lc test and his death due to colorectal cancer." 213 W. Va. at 224, 579 S.E.2d at 565. In syllabus point one of Mays, the Court explained that "'the proximate cause of an injury is the last negligent act contributing to the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.' Syllabus Point 5, Hartley v. Crede, 140 W.Va. 133, 82 S.E.2d 672 (1954), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kopa, 173 W. Va. 43, 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983)." This Court clarified in Mays that a plaintiff, while bearing the "burden of proof ... to show that a defendant's breach of a particular duty of care was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury," is not required to demonstrate that such breach was the sole proximate cause of the injury. 213 W. Va. at 224, 579 S.E.2d at 565. In syllabus point two of Mays, this Court explained as follows: "A party in a tort action is not required to prove that the negligence of one sought to be charged with an injury was the sole proximate cause of an injury. Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co., 129 W. Va. 267, 40 S.E.2d 324 (1946), is overruled to the extent it states a contrary rule." Syllabus Point 2, Everly v. Columbia Gas of West Virginia, Inc., 171 W. Va. 534, 301 S.E.2d 165 (1982). In addressing questions of causation, the Court has been careful to defer to the judgment of a jury where different conclusions may be drawn from the presented facts, noting that "questions of proximate cause are often fact-based, issues reserved for jury resolution." Mays, 213 W. Va. at 224, 579 S.E.2d at 565. In syllabus point three of Mays, the Court stated: "Questions of negligence, due care, proximate cause and concurrent negligence present issues of fact for jury determination when the evidence pertaining to such issues is conflicting or where the facts, even though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them." Syllabus Point 5, Hatten v. Mason Realty Co., 148 W.Va. 380, 135 S.E.2d 236 (1964). The Court explained that while a plaintiff has the burden of proving that a defendant's breach of a particular duty of care was a proximate cause of his or her injuries, the plaintiff does not have to show that such breach was the sole proximate cause of the injury. Mays, 213 W.Va. at 224, 579 S.E.2d at 565. Accordingly, the Court held in Syllabus Point 2 of Mays that: "'A party in a tort action is not required to prove that the negligence of one sought to be charged with an injury was the sole proximate cause of an injury. Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co., 129 W.Va. 267, 40 S.E.2d 324 (1946), is overruled to the extent it states a contrary rule.' Syllabus Point 2, Everly v. Columbia Gas of West Virginia, Inc., 171 W.Va. 534, 301 S.E.2d 165 (1982)."