Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970) held that when a party stipulates that a term be made part of the divorce judgment-a term that would not be enforceable without the stipulation-the party is estopped from challenging that term in the judgment, and it may be enforced by the court's contempt powers. 47 Wis. 2d at 639-641. In Bliwas the term stipulated to concerned contribution to the child's education beyond the age required by statute. 47 Wis. 2d at 637-38. The principle established in Bliwas is applicable in this case, and obligates Jirschele to comply with the provision in the divorce judgment that he is "equally responsible for the support of Amber if she pursues post-secondary education." The fact that the provision in Bliwas was more detailed does not make the principle established in Bliwas inapplicable to this case: the holding in Bliwas was not based on the specificity of the provision but rather on the general rule that "a party who procures or consents to the entry of the decree is estopped to question its validity." Id. at 640.