Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne

In Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520 (1957), the Court indicated transfer applications should be considered as original applications. At the time Whitesides was decided, 53-205, W.C.S. 1945, the predecessor of 12-4-104, did not reference the term "transfer." The applicant, who had a liquor license for a number of years at the Frontier Hotel, applied for a new license to be issued for another location. He did so by completing the regular form but marked it "Retail Liquor License and renewal thereof at new location." 319 P.2d at 521. Addressing the question of whether this license had the characteristics of a "renewal" with rights of appeal, Chief Justice Blume stated in relevant part: Unlike the provisions in many other states, the legislature in this state has seen fit not to grant the right of appeal in all cases. Such right is distinctly limited. It is not given when an applicant wants an original license and which is denied. It is limited to those applying for a renewal. . . .Counsel for applicant contends, if we understand him correctly, that the right of renewal granted by statute means a new license without reference to its terms, that is to say, even though a location different from that mentioned in the license sought to be renewed is asked for, the change of location makes no difference whatever. Of course that cannot be true, particularly in view of the importance attached by various provisions of our statutes to the place for dispensing liquor. We cannot follow counsel's reasoning. When oxygen is combined with hydrogen, the former loses its identity. An entirely different element arises. So when the demand for a new license which is limited to a certain place is combined with a demand for a change of location, an entirely new situation comes into existence. . . . . . . When, accordingly, the statute speaks of the renewal of a license, it speaks of one which contains the same terms and conditions of the old license, namely, one which permits the sale of intoxicating liquor at the same place as permitted in the old license. It is the denial of that kind of license from which an appeal may be taken to the district court and not from the denial of another kind. . . . . . . . In this case we should probably consider the application of the applicant as an original application for a license. There are many cases holding that where the statute provides for no appeal to the courts, or forbids it, as our state does except to a limited extent, the action of the governing board is final. Scott v. Township Board of Arcada Tp., 268 Mich. 170, 255 N.W. 752; State ex rel. Renner v. Noel, 346 Mo. 286, 140 S.W.2d 57; Marsh v. Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 54 R.I. 57, 169 A. 747; Duncan v. Superior Court of Pinal County, 65 Ariz. 193, 177 P.2d 374; Minkoff v. Payne, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 123, 210 F.2d 689; Appeal of Zeltner, 174 Pa.Super. 98, 100 A.2d 132; Jones v. Kellogg, Tex.Civ.App., 140 S.W.2d 592; State of Texas v. Lemaster, Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W.2d 164; Ziebell v. Hall, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 899. (319 P.2d at 523-25.)