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Lack of Recollection of An Alcohol Test After An Accident

In the Matter of Krahn, 1977 OK 168, 569 P.2d 982, the Court cited Hoban v. Rice, 25 Ohio St. 2d 111, 267 N.E.2d 311 (1971), with approval. the court said:

The licensee's words, acts, overall conduct and other manifestations of a willingness or unwillingness to take the sobriety test will be considered by the trier of facts in determining whether there was a refusal.

The determination will be based on an objective standard, not a subjective standard, such as the state of mind of the licensee.

The subjective state of mind of the licensee cannot control the outcome of the proceedings, and a police officer is not required to know the state of mind of the person arrested and determine whether such person understood he was refusing to submit to the test.

To require that would place an impossible burden on the arresting officer.

Appellant's lack of recollection is not inconsistent with his refusal to take the sobriety test.

It is possible for a licensee to be in such a state of intoxication that he does not understand what is happening, and, at the same time, by words, acts and general conduct to manifest an unwillingness or outright refusal to take the test.

Although he may later have no memory of what occurred, his mere statement that he does not remember anything that happened is insufficient to show that he did not refuse to take the test.

If we were to adopt appellant's theory, a licensee could refuse the test prescribed by R.C. 4511.191(A) and then, at a Municipal Court hearing, testify that he does not remember anything. the result could be to nullify the effect of the statute.

We cannot subscribe to the defense of 'too drunk to understand' as a means of nullifying the effect of the implied-consent statute without additional legislative requirements that the refusal be intelligently, knowingly, and intentionally made.